Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references. by Pulido, M. et al.
Compromise solutions for bankruptcy
situations with references
M. Pulido1,2,P .B o r m 3,R .H e n d r i c k x 3,N .L l o r c a 1,J .S á n c h e z - S o r i a n o 1
Abstract: This paper deals with bankruptcy situations in which in ad-
dition to the claims, an exogenously given reference point for the allocation
of the estate is present. We introduce and analyse two types of compromise
solutions and show that they coincide with the τ value of two corresponding
TU games. We apply our solutions to a real-life case of allocating university
money to degree courses.
1 Introduction
Bankruptcy problems were ﬁrst introduced by O’Neill (1982) and have been
subsequently analysed in a variety of contexts. In a bankruptcy situation,
one has to divide a given amount of money (the estate) among a set of agents,
each of whom has a rightful claim on the estate. The total amount claimed
typically exceeds the estate available, so not all the claims of the agents can
be fully satisﬁed.
In some situations, however, the claims of the players are not the only
quantities that are relevant for determining how to divide the estate. Pulido
et al. (2002) analyse the problem of dividing a sum of money to the various
degree courses that are oﬀered at Miguel Hernández University in Elche,
Spain. Each course has a claim, which reﬂects in some way the monetary
needs of this course. These needs are determined within a ﬁxed set of rules
and are veriﬁable to everyone involved. In addition to these claims, the
Valencian government (Generalitat Valenciana)p r o v i d e sas e to fr u l e so fi t s
own to indicate what each course should get, without taking into account how
much money is available. This allocation can be considered as an exogenous
reference point for determining a fair division of the estate.
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1Clearly, both the claims and the references form a relevant basis for the
allocation decision. The natural question is how the two sets of data in such
a bankruptcy situation with references should be combined in order to reach
a fair outcome. In Pulido et al. (2002), the special case is considered, in
which the estate suﬃces to implement the reference point. In this case, the
references can be interpreted as rights. They describe a two-stage procedure
which ﬁrst gives each claimant his reference amount and then shares the
remainder using a bankruptcy rule.
In this paper, we consider situations in which the estate is not necessarily
big enough to pay all reference amounts. Hence, we do not regard these
references as rights. As a result, our analysis extends the analysis in Pulido
et al. (2002), but we provide diﬀerent answers on the class of situations in
which both models are applicable.
We consider two ways in which the claim and reference vectors are com-
bined and for either approach, we deﬁne a compromise solution. The under-
lying idea is the following: for each player we combine the claim and reference
vectors in such a way that the resulting outcome to him is maximal given a
benchmark bankruptcy rule. Doing this for every player, we obtain an upper
vector, which can be seen as a utopia point. On the other hand, we ﬁnd for
each player that combination which gives him a minimal outcome given the
same benchmark, which results in a lower vector. A compromise solution is
then deﬁned as the convex combination of the upper and lower vector that
is eﬃcient with respect to the estate. For both approaches we also deﬁne a
corresponding bankruptcy game with references. These games are exact, but
not necessarily convex. The compromise solutions turn out to coincide with
the τ values (Tijs, 1981) of these games.
To illustrate our compromise rules, we apply them to the university case
that was also analysed in Pulido et al. (2002).
The paper is organised as follows. First, in section 2 we introduce bank-
ruptcy situations with references. In section 3 we introduce a new monotonic-
ity property for bankruptcy rules and present our compromise solutions. In
section 4 we deﬁne and analyse the two corresponding games and show that
the compromise solutions coincide with their τ values. For the university
case these solutions are presented in section 5.
22 Bankruptcy with references
A bankruptcy situation (O’Neill, 1982) is a triple (N,E,d),w h e r eN is the
ﬁnite set of agents, E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided and d ∈ RN
+ is the vector
of claims such that
P
i∈N di ≥ E. Every bankruptcy situation (N,E,d) gives
rise to a bankruptcy game (N,v), where the value of a coalition S ⊂ N is
given by




So v(S) is the part of the estate which is left for the players in S after the
claims of the players in N\S have been satisﬁed. Hence, in computing the
value of a coalition, a pessimistic point of view is taken.
A bankruptcy rule is a function f that assigns to every bankruptcy situ-
ation (N,E,d) av e c t o rf(N,E,d) ∈ RN such that




A bankruptcy situation with references (Pulido et al. (2002)) is a 4-tuple
(N,E,r,c),w h e r eN is the ﬁnite set of agents, E ≥ 0 is the estate under
contest, r ∈ RN




i∈N ci ≥ E.T h e c l a i m v e c t o r c has the same interpretation
as the vector d in standard bankruptcy situations, while r represents some
exogenously given reference point for the division of the estate. We assume
that ri ≤ ci for every player i ∈ N.
For a vector x ∈ RN and a coalition S ⊂ N,w ed e n o t eb yxS the restricted
vector (xi)i∈S and x(S)=
P
i∈S xi.F u r t h e r m o r e ,w ed e n o t eR = r(N) and
C = c(N).
Pulido et al. (2002) distinguish between two types of bankruptcy situa-
tions with references: CERO-bankruptcy situations (C ≥ E ≥ R ≥ 0)a n d
CREO-bankruptcy situations (C ≥ R>E≥ 0). They only analyse the
CERO case, in which the estate is suﬃcient to give each player his reference
amount. So basically, such situation can be solved by ﬁrst allocating this
reference point and then dividing the surplus E −R. Using this idea, Pulido
et al. (2002) deﬁne corresponding CERO bankruptcy games.
In this paper, we consider both cases simultaneously. The analysis diﬀers
from the CERO case, because in our context the references cannot necessarily
3all be satisﬁed and can therefore not be considered as rights. Hence, we
take a diﬀerent approach to solving such situations and deﬁning appropriate
corresponding games. Note that as a result, the analysis diﬀers from Pulido
et al. (2002) even on the class of CERO situations.
3 Compromise solutions
In this section, we deﬁne two (families of) compromise solutions for bank-
ruptcy situations with references. In order to come to a solution we have to
make some assumptions on the way in which the claims and reference point
are used to divide the money. Obviously, the claim and reference vectors
should both be taken into account, but this can be done in a number of
ways. We assume that ﬁrst a new combined demand vector is constructed,
reﬂecting both r and c. After that, a given bankruptcy rule f is applied
to this new vector. This rule f reﬂects some benchmark rule for evaluating
claims and can be interpreted, eg, as the method that was used on a previous
occasion to solve a similar bankruptcy problem.
We assume that f satisﬁes complementary monotonicity (CM):f o r
all S ⊂ N and d,d0 ∈ RN
+ such that dj = d0
j, for all j ∈ N\S and di ≤ d0
i for
all i ∈ S, we have that fj(N,E,d) ≥ fj(N,E,d0) for all j ∈ N\S.U s i n ga n
induction argument, it is easily established that this is equivalent with the
same requirement only for all one-person coalitions S.
Most well-known bankruptcy rules satisfy (CM), as is shown in Pulido
(2001). One notable exception is the adjusted proportional rule. In this
paper, we use two bankruptcy rules that are (CM): the proportional rule,
which distributes the estate proportional to the claims, and the constrained
equal award (CEA) rule, which allocates min{α,di} to claimant i,w h e r eα
is uniquely determined by eﬃciency.
We solve a bankruptcy situation with references by means of a compro-
mise solution. Given the benchmark f,w ed e t e r m i n ef o re a c hp l a y e rw h i c h
combination of references and claims leads to the highest outcome for him
and which to his lowest outcome. This leads to an upper and lower bound for
the allocation of the estate. The compromise solution is then simply deﬁned
a st h eu n i q u ee ﬃcient convex combination of these two vectors.
Geometrically, combining claims and references boils down to picking a
point in the hypercube Πi∈N[ri,c i]. We consider two approaches. In our ﬁrst
4approach, the extreme approach, we consider the extreme points of this
hypercube, ie, points in which some players demand their reference amount












if ri + c(N \{ i}) ≥ E,











if ci + r(N \{ i}) ≥ E,
ci if ci + r(N \{ i}) <E ,
for all i ∈ N. It follows from CM that (ri,cN\{i}) is the worst extreme point
for player i and that (ci,rN\{i}) is the best. If in a point the estate suﬃces
to satisfy all demands, then player i gets what is left by the other players,
with a maximum of his own claim ci.
In the following lemma, which we will prove in section 4, we show that
lf and Lf can indeed be considered as lower and upper bounds, respectively,
for the division of the estate.
Lemma 1 Let (N,E,r,c) be a bankruptcy situation with references. Then










The extreme compromise solution γf is deﬁned by
γ
f = αl
f +( 1− α)L
f,




f)=E. As a result of the
previous lemma, such α exists.
In our second approach, the diagonal approach,w ec o n s i d e rt h em a i n
diagonal of the hypercube. The lower and upper vectors¯ lf and ¯ Lf are deﬁned
by
li


















fi(N,E,λr +( 1− λ)c) if λR +( 1− λ)C ≥ E,




) if λR +( 1− λ)C<E
with E
λ
= E −(λR+(1−λ)C) and d
λ
= c−(λr+(1−λ)c)=λ(c−r).I n
the second part of the deﬁnition the agents receive what is prescribed by the
weighted vector and the remainder ¯ Eλ is distributed according to the rule f,
using the residual claims ¯ dλ.
Also in the diagonal case, the vectors ¯ l and ¯ L can be considered as lower
and upper bounds, as was shown for the extreme approach in Lemma 1.
The diagonal compromise solution ¯ γf is deﬁned by
¯ γ
f = α¯ l
f +( 1− α)¯ L
f,
where α ∈ [0,1] is such that
P
i∈N(α¯ li
f +( 1− α)¯ Li
f)=E.
4 Bankruptcy games with references
In this section, we deﬁne for either approach a corresponding cooperative
game, depending on a bankruptcy rule f (which we assume to satisfy CM).
The usual procedure in cooperative game theory is ﬁrst to deﬁne the value
of each coalition and then as a second step apply a solution concept to ﬁnd
an allocation. Note that in our speciﬁcs e t t i n g ,t h er u l ef in the deﬁnition
of the game should not be interpreted as a proposal for dividing the value of
the grand coalition (ie, the estate). Rather, as in the deﬁnitions of the upper
and lower vectors in the previous section, it represents some benchmark rule
for evaluating claims, which each coalition uses to compute a fair estimate
of its worth. So contrary to standard bankruptcy games, the uncertainty
for a coalition here is not the way in which the claims are processed (in a
bankruptcy game, each coalition assumes that it is served last), but the way
in which the claims and references are combined.







i∈S fi(N,E,(rS,cN\S)) if r(S)+c(N\S) ≥ E,
E − c(N \ S) if r(S)+c(N\S) <E
6for all S ⊂ N.N o t et h a ti fr(S)+c(N\S) <E , the ensuing problem is not
a bankruptcy situation and the players in S can obtain what is left by the
players in N\S.
As a result of CM, it immediately follows that (rS,cN\S) is the worst
point for S in the hypercube, thus vf(S) actually represents the most pes-
simistic situation for coalition S under the extreme approach. Although it
is intuitively clear that this should be the worst point for S,w en e e dC Mt o
ensure that it is actually so4.
The diagonal game is deﬁned by ¯ vf(S)=i n f λ∈[0,1] ¯ v
f
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
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if λR +( 1− λ)C<E ,
with E
λ
= E − (λR +( 1− λ)C) and d
λ
= c − (λr +( 1− λ)c)=λ(c − r).
Note that if (N,E,r,c) is a CREO-bankruptcy situation, then in the
deﬁnitions of both vf and ¯ vf only the ﬁrst case arises.
As a result of CM, it is easy to check that the game vf is more pessimistic
than ¯ vf,i e ,vf(S) ≤ ¯ vf(S) for all S ⊂ N.
A game (N,v) is convex (cf. Shapley (1971)) if
v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∩ T)+v(S ∪ T)
for all S,T ⊂ N.T h ecore of a game (N,v) is deﬁned by
C(v)={x ∈ R
N |x(N)=v(N),∀S⊂N : x(S) ≥ v(S)}.
Ag a m e(N,v) is exact (Driessen and Tijs, 1985) if for all S ⊂ N there exists
an x ∈ C(v) such that x(S)=v(S). Exactness is a weaker property than
convexity. The extreme and diagonal games corresponding to a bankruptcy
situation with references turn out to be exact, as is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Let (N,E,r,c) be a bankruptcy situation with references.
T h e nt h et w oc o r r e s p o n d i n gg a m e svf and ¯ vf are exact.
4Pulido (2001) shows that for the adjusted proportional rule, which is not CM, this is
not the case.
7Proof. First, we prove exactness of vf.L e t S ⊂ N and distinguish
between two cases:











, so x(S)=vf(S). It is easy to check
that, because f is CM, x ∈ C(vf).




ci if i ∈ N\S,
ri + fi(S,E − c(N\S) − r(S),cS − rS) if i ∈ S,
for all i ∈ N.
Obviously, x(N)=E = vf(N) and x(S)=E − c(N\S)=vf(S). Let
T ⊂ N and distinguish between two cases:








(b) If r(T)+c(N/T) <E ,then vf(T)=E − c(N\T). Deﬁne T1 =




fi(S,E − c(N\S) − r(S);cS − rS)




= E + c(T1) − c(N\S) − c(S\T2)+r(T2)+r(S\T2) − r(S)
= E + c(T1) − c(N\T2)=E − c(N\T)=v
f(T).
Hence, x ∈ C(vf).
To show that ¯ vf is exact, let S ⊂ N and let λ
∗ ∈ [0,1] be such that






λ∗(S). We distinguish between two cases:
1. If λ
∗R +( 1− λ
∗)C ≥ E, then x = f(N,E,λ
∗r +( 1− λ
∗)c) ∈ C(¯ vf)
and x(S)=¯ vf(S).
2. If λ
∗R +( 1− λ
∗)C<E ,then x = λ
∗r +( 1− λ




∗(c − r)) ∈ C(¯ vf) and x(S)=¯ vf(S).
8Note that complementary monotonicity of f is not necessary to establish
exactness of ¯ vf.
T h en e x te x a m p l es h o w st h a tt h eg a m e svf and vf need not be convex.
Example 1 Consider the bankruptcy situation with references (N,E,r,c),
where N = {1,2,3,4}, E =1 2 , r =( 1 ,2,4,7) and c =( 3 ,3,5,10).T a k i n g
t h eC E Ar u l e ,w eo b t a i n
S {3}{ 1,3}{ 2,3}{ 1,2,3}
vCEA(S) 355 1
2 7




Therefore, vCEA and vCEA are not convex.
Using exactness of vf,w ec a nn o wp r o v eL e m m a1 .
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . From complementary monotonicity of f, lf ≤ Lf
readily follows. For the second statement, ﬁrst observe that l
f
i = vf({i}) for











If i ∈ N is such that ci + r(N\{i}) <E ,t h e nL
f
i = ci ≥ fi(N,E,c).
On the other hand, if ci + r(N\{i}) ≥ E,t h e nL
f
i = fi(N,E,(ci,rN\{i})) ≥








The τ value (Tijs, 1981) of a quasi-balanced game (N,v) is deﬁned by
τ(v)=αm(v)+( 1− α)M(v),
where Mi(v)=v(N)−v(N \{i}), mi(v) = maxS:i∈S{v(S)−
P
j∈S\{i} Mj(v)}
for all i ∈ N and α ∈ [0,1] is such that
P
i∈N τi(v)=v(N). The class
of quasi-balanced games contains the class of exact games, so as a result
9of Proposition 2, the τ v a l u ei sd e ﬁned for both bankruptcy games with
references.
The extreme compromise solution coincides with the τ value of the game
vf,a si ss t a t e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gt h e o r e m .
Theorem 3 Let (N,E,r,c) be a bankruptcy situation with references and
let f be a complementary monotonic bankruptcy rule. Then γf = τ(vf).
Proof. Driessen and Tijs (1985) proved that for each exact game (N,v),
mi(v)=v({i}) for all i ∈ N.H e n c e ,mi(vf)=vf({i})=l
f




















otherwise. Hence, Lf = M(vf). From this, we conclude that γf = τ(vf).
Similarly, one can prove the analogous result for the diagonal compromise
solution.
Theorem 4 Let (N,E,r,c) be a bankruptcy situation with references and
let f be a complementary monotonic bankruptcy rule. Then ¯ γf = τ(¯ vf).
5C a s e
In this section we consider the case of dividing university money as described
in Pulido et al (2002). The problem is as follows: in the academic year 2000-
2001, the Universidad Miguel Hernández in Elche, Spain, had 717,239.11
euros to divide among the 27 diﬀerent degree courses to buy equipment for
10teaching laboratories. The board of the university decided to create a com-
mittee to study how to allocate the money. This committee asked each
teaching unit what their real needs were and added these demands for each
degree course. Therefore, these demands represent the claims of each admin-
istrative entity (degree course representative) and they were based on reports
on the requirements for the next academic period.
Since these demands could be biased (due to way in which they were
obtained) and could include a high level of subjectivity, the committee looked
for a more objective measure for reference. In this case, these reference
amounts were obtained by applying objective criteria and laws provided by
the Generalitat Valenciana to support the public university system. These
criteria take into account, for each degree course, concepts like the number
of students, the number of academic years that the course exists, and so on.
The table below shows the vectors of references and claims, together with
the outcomes (in euros) using the compromise solutions. Note that the estate
is greater than the total amount of the references, (404,816.17), and less than
the total of claims, (4,078,097.61),s ot h i si saCERO situation. Pulido et al.
(2002) tackled this problem by ﬁrst distributing the reference for each degree
course and, afterwards, the remainder was shared according to a standard
bankruptcy rule.
11Degree r c γCEA γCEA γPROP γPROP
1 3500,29 15720,66 4635,16 9353,95 3106,79 3652,28
2 3164,85 25532,20 5242,03 9735,25 4675,68 4778,88
3 17720,24 32960,44 19135,55 24721,18 8045,22 12406,70
4 2483,86 13664,61 3522,18 7839,54 2618,07 2919,05
5 2786,77 8173,76 3287,04 5367,19 1757,09 2341,26
6 3904,17 3904,17 3904,17 3904,17 1216,96 2295,41
7 5452,38 14869,04 6326,87 9963,04 3253,47 4434,20
8 21439,30 289753,13 46356,69 39197,91 51128,33 47610,37
9 24384,26 250962,13 45425,78 38863,55 45156,26 43896,77
10 21203,71 126857,13 31015,38 34468,04 24106,11 26250,47
11 19350,35 248338,50 40615,69 37853,46 43942,80 41251,60
12 38284,47 227091,64 50184,29 42268,85 43325,97 47141,50
13 3769,55 63069,72 9276,55 19901,55 10957,08 9952,82
14 3937,83 15915,98 5050,20 9675,47 3203,41 3877,92
15 2692,53 10059,72 3376,70 6221,48 2054,27 2544,20
16 37595,35 530070,44 61600,06 52478,51 76116,29 86354,18
17 27882,87 121229,15 36551,62 36198,29 24172,70 28571,76
18 31758,44 233163,45 50462,24 40312,52 43337,49 44948,17
19 33548,98 248008,45 52126,76 41379,22 46078,44 47704,03
20 3251,24 169534,83 18693,42 25793,58 28440,75 23605,61
21 24173,91 240404,84 44254,54 38559,43 43373,41 42423,19
22 27861,67 250845,44 48569,41 39732,68 45673,83 45472,37
23 5041,77 70752,96 11144,14 21177,15 12414,27 11537,22
24 4099,38 140679,05 16783,07 25314,25 23809,86 20228,96
25 14065,13 227684,44 33903,22 33582,56 39707,35 36139,13
26 12627,99 234125,14 33197,67 32717,70 40550,14 36321,96
27 8834,88 264726,58 32598,67 30658,59 45017,09 38579,11
Total 404816,17 4078097,61 717239,11 717239,11 717239,11 717239,11
Table 1. Compromise Solutions
The last four columns represent the compromise solutions provided by
the CEA and the proportional rule (which are very easy to implement) under
the extreme (γf) and the diagonal (γf) approaches. Note that the references
have not to be respected. For example, using the proportional rule, under
both approaches the third agent receives less than his reference amount. As
12indicated earlier, this is not the situation for the CERO approach described
in Pulido et al (2002), where each agent receives at least his reference.
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